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COMMENT ON PROFESSOR LEWIS' PAPER
Jo DESHA LucAs*
D ROFESSOR Lewis points out that the general and marked preference of
Americans for living, working, and going to school with others of their own
stamp creates an hiatus in services for Negroes, for there are few places in
which accommodations operated for Negroes alone can survive economically, and
"The needs of the individual Negro can be provided for only if he is allowed
to participate in the system which provides services across the nation for the
public generally." It is the function of government to correct such a malfunction-
ing of the private enterprise system, he suggests, and since quite obviously no,
political majority could be mustered in support of action in the areas in which
preferences of this sort have a high emotional charge, it should be corrected
at the national level. It remains to parcel out the appointed tasks of the co-
ordinate departments.
I doubt that anyone would deny that this problem exists, and there are
those who would add arguments of "social policy" and ethics. As an argument
for legislation, addressed to the state legislature, Professor Lewis' thesis is a
relatively convincing one, and his proposal relatively modest. He suggests that
where public accommodations receive direct, or what he refers to as "extraordi-
nary," financial aid from the government, and the aid is given for the purpose of
assuring that services are rendered to the public (as distinct from aid designed to
improve the lot of the recipient, such as welfare payments and educational grants
to individuals), those accommodations should be treated as public, at least to the
extent that those who operate them should not be permitted to select their
clientele on the basis of race or religion. Further, he suggests that when an
individual makes a facility available to all except selected minority groups
without inquiry as to particular attributes, where the public generally has the
expectation that it will be received without question, the facility must be made
available to minority members as well.
This proposal permits clannishness but not prejudice, and proceeds upon
the assumption that a white who is willing to share facilities with other whites
without first inquiring as to whether they are washed, educated, or in the least
compatible, will not be heard to excuse exclusion of Negroes on the ground of
selectivity of companions. Though I suspect that this line is harder to draw than
Professor Lewis seems to think, it is a line which commends itself to common
sense. It excludes the private club and Mrs. Murphy's celebrated boarding house.
So far, however, we have talked only about what is a sensible proposal for
correction of what has been identified as an economic and in the opinion of some
a social and ethical problem. The problem of implementation is another matter
and depends, of course, upon the allocation of power under our Constitution.
First, as to publicly assisted accommodations. It is obvious that recent cases
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Chicago.
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point in the direction of Professor Lewis' suggested line. As he points out,
the problem of publicly assisted enterprise is one which adapts itself to solution
under the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause, for in the giving of assist-
ance the Court can find "state action" without doing violence to that concept.
The only arguable objection to the trend of these cases, and to Professor Lewis'
analysis, is the unfairness involved in the retroactive application of the princi-
pal to facilities provided largely by private capital which would not have been
risked if the assisting governmental unit had required open use of the facilities.
A case in point is Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,1 which Professor Lewis
criticises. Had the contract involved in that case been challenged in a taxpayer's
action, the Equal Protection Clause question could have been settled directly
before $90,000,000 was invested. Even after the sale of the land, presumably
the sale could be invalidated, the land reconveyed, and the investors reimbursed,
leaving the project a purely public facility.
In the short run, of course, Professor Lewis' solution opens up a large
housing facility to nonsegregated use without calling upon the city to buy it.
It must be remembered, however, that in the long run it may result in no more
such projects, at least if we take as true Commissioner Robert Moses' statement
to the Governor and Board of Estimate that if any requirement was imposed
which deprived the landlord of the right to select its tenants, no private venture
would go into the business. Another case in point is Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp.,2 also criticised by Professor Lewis. In Simkins it was held that
the fact that a private hospital had received substantial construction grants
under the Hill-Burton Act3 did not entitle Negro doctors and patients to equal
treatment by the management. There is no doubt that the federal government
could have conditioned the grant upon the operation of nonsegregated facilities,
and little doubt that it did not do so because of a fear that with any such
requirement, there would have been no Hill-Burton Act at all. And so it has
been with other federal assistance programs. Proposals to condition them upon
desegregation have been introduced, sometimes supported by persons opposed
to the program because they thought the condition would result in the death of
the bill on the floor and opposed by friends of the bill for the same reason.
This problem is indeed a very old one. The Civil Rights Act of 18754 included
schools within the list of facilities which must not discriminate and before it
left the Congress this part of the Act was dropped with the consent of a leading
Negro member from South Carolina because of a fear that its inclusion would
abort the development of schools in the SouthY
In the long run, therefore, a decision that government may not give
1. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
2. 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
3. 60 Stat. 631, 42 U.S.C. § 291(e),(f) (1958).
4. 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (part 3).
5. See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws,"
50 Colum. L. Rev. 131, 161 (1950).
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financial assistance to the creation of facilities unless the facilities are operated
on a nonsegregated basis is not a decision that nonsegregated facilities will be
provided, but rather a limitation upon the government's ability to encourage the
creation of new facilities, otherwise desirable. Clannish taxpayers who receive
nothing from the public spending programs in this area and are forced to create
their own facilities with no assistance, may well become more resistant to purely
public projects, such as public housing, from which Negroes derive a dispropor-
tionate benefit.
Of course Professor Lewis recognizes this possibility of reprivatization of
facilities, and his second proposal is designed to deal with it, at least in the
area of obviously public facilities. The motel in the redeveloped area,6 and
the recreational facilities in the public park,7 he can approach through "state
action," but the privately operated commercial hotels, motels, theatres, amuse-
ment parks, and personal service establishments like barber shops and beauty
parlors cannot be called "state action" in any conventional sense. From the
absence of "state action" two things have been said to flow. First, there is no
constitutionally protected right to equal treatment,8 and second, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not empower Congress to afford such a right.9 If this is so,
national solution of the problem must proceed along other lines. For example,
under the Commerce Clause and Acts of Congress the Court has banned segre-
gation in facilities construed to be a part of public transportation, such as
restaurants in bus stations.' 0 And the Supreme Court has sufficiently vulcanized
the Commerce Clause to lead some to believe that most, if not all, public
facilities could be controlled under that provision.'1
There are two reasons why this approach does not commend itself to desegre-
gationists, at least as a total measure of the application of the national law
to public facilities. The first is because it may impose some limitations on the
reach of the law. The second, and perhaps more important, is that control under
the Commerce Clause would almost certainly require Congressional action and
current experience indicates that Congressional action is hard to get and subject
to bargain. If it were held that private action were subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment, or that the action of otherwise private entrepreneurs in providing
public facilities is "state action," then the federal courts could proceed to force
desegregation in such facilities by declaration, injunction, and conceivably
criminal penalties under existing civil rights legislation.
A number of suggestions have been made recently as to what the Supreme
Court should say when it moves in this direction. Justice Douglas says, for
example, that wherever the state licenses an establishment, that establishment
6. See Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963);
Professor Lewis' discussion at 409-10.
7. See Professor Lewis' discussion at 406.
8. Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 115 U.S. 611 (1885).
9. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10. Without benefit of anything expressed in the legislation.
11. Witness proposals presently before the Congress.
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becomes subject to the Amendment.' 2 This approach has quite obvious problems.
for licenses are nothing more than devices for the policing of some underlying
regulations, and private parties are subject to such regulation. The law may
require me to have a toilet in my house and enforce it by requiring that I
get a building permit yet certainly my home is not by that fact open to all
and sundry. It may require me to obtain a driver's license and a license for my
car, but surely that does not make me obliged to drive my neighbors to work.
Where licenses are used to enforce revenue provisions, every conceivable activity
may be licensed.
Others have approached the problem through a definition of "state action"'
which includes "inaction." In short, the state may not permit a discrimination
it is empowered to prohibit.13 This approach, in light of the fact that the Amend-
ment nowhere limits itself to racial discrimination, is certainly a reverse twist
on the adage, "thank God we do not get all the government we pay for."
Professor Lewis rejects these solutions as excessive and suggests that the
Court extend the protections of the Amendment in the following fashion. Step
one-where the law forbids selection of clientele according to whim, and gives
redress to a white man excluded for an irrational reason, failure to afford the
Negro this protection is violative of the requirement of "Equal Protection.'
Step two-where the white community has a general expectation that its mem-
bers will be served without any inquiry into their worth or social graces, by a
"kind of common law," this expectation should be treated as equivalent to a
legal right, and the Amendment should be construed to prohibit exclusion of
Negroes.
There is only a small gap, says Professor Lewis, between this generally
fulfilled expectation and a legal right, and the Court has filled little gaps before
and should do so now. As examples of this process he mentions the Shelley,14
Marsh15 and Altwright16 cases. Though there are undoubtedly some analogies
which can be drawn between these cases and the problem of segregated public
accommodations, I suggest that these analogies are not very strong. In each of
these cases the Court was faced with a widespread device designed to limit
individual choice or generally to subvert rights concededly protected by the
Constitution. There is no doubt, for instance, that a Negro has a right to buy
and sell property; and a system of covenants which limit the power of the owner
to sell to Negroes can be likened to other systems of compulsion where the
whole plan depends upon the state courts for its workability. It is a widespread
restriction upon freedom aimed at preservation of segregated housing, and de-
pendant upon enforcement by the state courts. In Allright, too, the right allegedly
infringed was the right to vote in elections which as a practical matter always
12. See opinion of Douglas, J., in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 183 (1961).
13. Professor Lewis discusses the Henkin analysis at 414-19.
14. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
15. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
16. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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decided the question of who would serve as public officers exercising powers over
whites and Negroes alike, and the Court could take the position that the exercise
of the franchise is a matter which cannot be private. In Marsh, as well, the
activities of the company in making rules for public behavior enforced by
state criminal penalties in a town to all intents and purposes like any other
town, were governmental enough to justify the Court in treating -the enforce-
ment as limited by the First and Fourteenth Amendment protections of freedom
of speech.
In the public accommodations area it has recently been noted that
systems which apply pressure to enforce segregation in public accommodations
may not enjoy state enforcement, at least where the pressure is applied by
state activities.17 Under the principles of Shelley, Allwright and Marsh, it would
not be surprising to find that private enforcement of such pressures could not
be implemented through civil actions.
Where there is a perfectly free choice, however, on the part of each property
owner (in the Shelley context) to sell to a Negro or not, certainly nothing in
that opinion suggests that the federal courts would order specific performance
in favor of a Negro on a contract which he didn't have. Nor is there anything
in Marsh to suggest that an individual tavern operator could not ban a prospec-
tive drinker because of his views on the chances of the New York Mets.
Professor Lewis is no doubt aware of the difficulty of establishing the
right to be protected by the Court in the public accommodations cases. He glances
wistfully at the Privileges and Immunities Clause but concedes that as interpreted
in the Slaughter-House Cases'8 there is not much comfort there. In this connec-
tion it might be said that had the minority had its way in those cases, there
would not have been much comfort anyway, for it must be remembered that two
of the dissenters, Justices Bradley and Field, joined the majority in the Civil
Rights Cases,19 Justice Bradley writing the opinion. Later, in O'Neil v. Ver-
mont,20 Justice Field indicated that he was of the opinion that the term
"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" meant those guar-
anteed in the Constitution in the first eight amendments, and elsewhere in the
Constitution. Justice Harlan concurred in this view but expressed it "These rights
are, principally, enumerated in the earlier Amendments of the Constitution."
This leaves open the possibility that he was of the opinion that other privileges
and immunities might be involved. It seems, however, that even he did not
think that the common law duties of equal service required of carriers were
privileges and immunities, for he joined in a unanimous opinion to that effect
in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.2 1
17. See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
18. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
19. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
20. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
21. 115 U.S. 611 (1885).
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Professor Lewis' reference to such cases as Corfield v. Coryel 2 2 and the
"kind of common law" referred to by Justice M'Lean in United States v.
Macdaniel 3 add little if anything to his argument. In Corfield, there was state
action aplenty. Public officers boarded the plaintiff's boat, took it by force of
arms, and sold it as a prize. It had been used in dredging oysters in violation
of the New Jersey oyster law. The contention was made that the law violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourth Article of the Constitution
because the state permitted its own citizens to take the oysters but prohibited
outsiders from doing so. Mr. Justice Bushrod Washington on circuit said the
property of the oysters was in the citizens of the state and therefore they could
keep them for themselves, limiting the constitutional provision to rights more
"fundamental." Certainly it is a long jump to proceed from that to the sug-
gestion that the term embraces the innkeeper's doctrine and such extensions of
it as the Court might in its wisdom decide upon. The "kind of common law" of
which Mr. Justice M'Lean spoke was custom within the government of allow-
ing commissions on disbursements made by Navy-agents. He was simply hold-
ing that such customs, as interpretations of legislation made by one secretary
and long acquiesced in, could not be repudiated by another to deprive people of
commissions to which they had already become entitled. What relevance this
has to the public accommodations problem is obscure, unless perhaps it can be
read against Professor Lewis' statement, "because of location or other factors,
some individuals who have invested heavily of their time and energies (and, it
might be added, their money) to create a small business (and, forsooth, perhaps
a large one) may be seriously injured in that business. But there is no feasible
way to account for this in a regulatory statute. A serious quirk in tie system of
private enterprise exists and it cannot be allowed to feed upon itself, to serve as
its own continuing justification, so to speak; it must be remedied by uniform
regulations."
In summary, were Professor Lewis arbitrator in a dispute between the
Chamber of Commerce of Hot Coffee, Mississippi, and the representatives of a
group of sitters-in, I could only commend him upon a sensible and restrained
suggestion for compromise, though personally I doubt that it would commend
itself to either side. Were he merely suggesting a compromise between legislative
factions facing a close vote in a forum admittedly empowered to act, I could
only commend him upon his low key and gentlemanly persuasiveness. As an
intepretation of the relevant portions of the Constitution of the United States,
I find Professor Lewis' major thesis wanting. I realize that it is developed as a
self-limiting principle as an alternative to the Douglas position on regulatory
licensing as carrying with it a "state action" label and to the Henkin suggestion
that government should be deemed to govern to the extent of its powers. I see
in it, however, an outright cession to the Supreme Court of the function of de-
22. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
23. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 15 (1833).
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-velopment of the common law of rights as among individuals, and if rights are to
be predicted upon the analogy upon which Professor Lewis' rights to service
rests, which I find as thin as Oliver's gruel, I see no limitation at all. I realize
that on occasion courts, including the Supreme Court, have drawn analogies no
stronger, but I do not think that they should be encouraged to reason in this
sort of way.
